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The Dream of Western Law. 
Legal Layers in Solzhenitsyn’s Gulag Archipelago
Abstract. This essay discusses Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn’s Gulag Archipelago from the aspect of “law and 
literature”. As a starting point, it argues that its “legal” reading is of a high relevance, since it helps us to better 
understand both the reality of Soviet law and the achievements of our legal systems. In order to illustrate this, it 
examines various legal layers embedded in the work: legal history, sociology of the punishment, criminal 
investigation, organizational sociology and psychology, and legal theory. In addition, the essay also focuses on the 
role of Western Law as a contrast in Solzhenitsyn’s work, and analyzes its metaphorical language about law. To 
conclude, it argues that this book could caution lawyers of the consequences of a politically-oriented approach to 
law that disregards the fundamental values of Western law.
Keywords: Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, Gulag Archipelago, Soviet law, law and politics, values of Western law, law 
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“La tâche de l’écrivain ne se borne pas á la propagation 
d’un système social. La tâche de l’écrivain  est de traiter 
des sujets universel et éternels …”1
I. Preliminary thoughts
This essay discusses a book which is of both a universal historical value and a manifest 
literary significance. In addition, its legal dimensions can also be viewed as important. 
Compared to this unambiguous “law and literature” relevance, it might be slightly surprising 
that Hungarian scholars, discussing legal questions from a literary point of view,2 have not 
taken into account Solzhenitsyn’s3 Gulag Archipelago thus far, although it is full of legal 
problems and law related questions from the outset.
The main aim of this paper is to recommend a law-oriented rereading of this classical 
book. The legal research of the Gulag Archipelago seems to be almost self-evident, as the 
titles of certain chapters suggest: The Law as a Child, The Law Becomes a Man, The Law 
Matures, The Supreme Measure (Chapters 8, 9, 10, and 11).
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1 Excerpt from a speech of Solzhenitsyn in 1967. It was held in the Union of Soviet Writers. 
Source: Alexandre Soljenitsyne, un phénomène nouveau de la littérature soviétique. Documentation 
sur l’Europe Centrale, 11 (1973) 3, 249.
2 See: Nagy, T.: Jozef K. nyomában (Following Jozef K.). Máriabesenyő-Gödöllő, 2010.; H. 
Szilágyi, I.: Jog – irodalom (Law–Literature)., Szeged, 2010.
3 About Solzhenitsyn see the comprehensive work of Scammel. Scammell, M.: Solzhenitsyn, a 
biography. New York–London, 1984. From the aspect of the history of Soviet literature: Loupan, N.: 
La littérature soviétique d’après-guerre. Documentation sur l’Europe Centrale, 14 (1976) 1, 17–31.
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What are the main legal points of Solzhenitsyn’s book? This essay tries to answer the 
question by referring to specific sections, but it does not make an attempt at a comprehensive 
legal analysis. These selected sections can illustrate the richness of the legal elements 
contained within the entire novel. The reason for this impressionistic approach is rather 
simple: the abundance of legal elements in Solzhenitsyn’s work would require a deeper 
analysis than this essay tries to achieve. This paper, therefore, does not strive for a general 
scope, but by analyzing certain excerpts it strives to foster future research.
Furthermore, the author of this paper would like to pay tribute to one of the most 
important writers of the 20th century. His oeuvre states, in addition to other important 
things, what a human being can do if he undertakes to represent an elementarily important 
case, even if he has to work in a completely reticent manner from the very beginning.4 At 
this point it should also be emphasized that Solzhenitsyn and his oeuvre had a considerable 
role in the shading of romantic conceptions about Communism that existed in the public 
opinion of Western Europe in the fifties and sixties. Together, his documentary work and 
novels provided invaluable assistance to Western intellectuals who gradually realized a 
more precise view of the reality of the Soviet world.5
II. Legal layers of the Gulag Archipelago 
The hypothesis of this essay is that this work of Solzhenitsyn, has numerous legal layers. 
Therefore, its main aim is to attract attention to the most important ones since their research 
could also be fascinating to the experts of other fields of study. For a legal analysis the most 
important part of the three volumes is the first twelve chapters of Part 1, where the reader 
can discover many associated legal elements. The remaining chapters, generally, have a 
more reminiscent and commemorative nature.
1. Legal histoy–towards an unconventional history of Soviet law
Perhaps the most evident choice, if one wants to learn the legal relevance of the Gulag 
Archipelago, is its analysis from the aspect of legal history. One can easily follow many 
aspects of Soviet legal history in Part 1 (The Prison Industry). For instance, the author 
presents and analyzes the history of Soviet fake trials from the very beginning by using the 
4 The huge impact of the Gulag Archipelago on the Soviet regime can be illustrated with a tiny, 
however very telling fact. Following its publication (it was firstly published in the West in 1973) the 
Soviet authorities even deleted the word archipelago from the official Russian dictionary. So, they 
symbolically declared the non-existence of the entire work. See: La disparition de mot “archipel” du 
vocabulaire officiel. Documentation sur l’Europe Centrale, 14 (1976) 2, 140.
5 The Western view on Communism is analyzed by Stéphane Courtois, a well-known French 
historian of Communism, in detail. He also discusses the role of Solzhenitsyn: “In the 1960’s and 
1980’s, Solzhenitsyn’s Gulag Archipelago and later the ‘Red Wheel’ cycle on the Russian Revolution 
produced a quantum shift in public opinion. Precisely, because it was literature, and from a master 
craftsman, the Gulag Archipelago captured the true nature of an unspeakable system”. Courtois also 
mentions Varlam Shalamov and Pin Yathay whose impact can be compared to that of Solzhenitsyn. 
Courtois, S.: Introduction: The Crimes of Communism. In: Courtois, S. et al.: The Black Book of 
Communism. Crimes, Terror, Repression. Cambridge-Massachusetts–London-England, 1999. 27.
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metaphor of waves,6 furthermore, he also points out the emergence of a special and ordinary 
criminal justice system.7 In addition, he offers a complete picture of the practice of courts 
concernine Art. 58 of the Criminal Code, most usually used for Siberian deportations,8 as 
well describes the development of the death penalty.9 The most fascinating aspect in this 
legal historical layer, is that Solzhenitsyn presents these problems to the reader not only 
with an impressive legal and sociological accuracy but also with a scientific accuracy. 
Moreover, neither the analysis of statistical data nor the legal constructions were unknown 
fields to him.
A good example of legal historical accuracy is the first part of the chapter which is 
devoted to the death penalty (11. The Supreme Measure). The author provides an overview 
of the history of the death penalty from the Code of Aleksei Mikhailovic Romanov to 1962. 
In these pages he also presents many efforts to abolish the death penalty and the crimes 
sanctioned by this measure. Within the references mentioned in the footnotes, one can even 
find a monograph dedicated to the death penalty from 1913. The author also cites the 
Bulletin of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. from 1959 that discusses the bases of Soviet 
criminal justice. Additionally, and this might the most interesting point, Solzhenitsyn points 
out the lack of authentic printed information; and this is the reason why he uses the data 
provided by an “unwritten tradition” stemming from the slaves of the Gulag. Therefore, his 
analysis, contrary to all efforts, cannot meet all the scientific criteria and cannot be as 
comprehensive as it would be in the case of a legal monograph.10
However, an absolutely different history of Soviet law takes shape, from the imperfect, 
but extensive data collected and analyzed by Solzhenitsyn, than a law student can get to 
know from the general manuals of modern legal history. It is a real question whether an 
interpretation of Soviet legal history based on Solzhenitsyn’s data can overrule this 
“traditional” and still surviving approach mainly by presenting the “glorious” side of the 
evolution of Soviet law.11 It can, however, be an excellent addition to this heavily biased 
approach. This “unconventional and real Soviet legal history” is legitimized as well as 
justified by the personal experiences of the author and his fellows and by the sound data 
collection, contrary to the approach of legal history manuals that are distant to the 
sociological dimension of law and are also obviously ideologically biased even today.
2.  The sociology of the administration of punishment–transformation of the society of 
Russian prisoners
It is more than evident that a legal interpretation of the Gulag Archipelago cannot stop at 
the presentation of legal historical dimensions, since Solzhenitsyn’s work also implies 
countless references to the Soviet system of the administration of punishment. The first 
volume documents both the history of the Soviet prison system as well as its real 
    6 Solzhenitsyn, A.: The Gulag Archipelago 1918–1956. An experiment in Literary Investigation. 
New York, Evanston, San Francisco, London, 1974. 24–60 and 69–92.
    7 Ibid. 281–286.
    8 Ibid. 60–68.
    9 Ibid. 432–440.
10 Ibid. 438.
11 See Kitekintés a szovjet állam és jog fejlődéstörténetére (An outlook on the development of 
the Soviet state and law). In: Gönczi, K. et al.: Egyetemes jogtörténet (General Legal History). 
Budapest, 2000. 559–588.
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functioning, in detail.12 It is very interesting, sometimes striking, that Solzhenitsyn contrasts 
his findings on the everyday life and functioning of Soviets prisons to those of the age of 
the Tsars. This comparison of the world of Soviet and that of pre-Soviet prisons reveals that 
the whole prison system of the age of the Tsars, notwithstanding that Communist 
propaganda tried to depict this political system as fearful and oppressive, was functioning 
more humanely than the jails of the progressive Soviet system.
The author was familiar with the functioning of this old, Tsarian system through the 
stories of those leftist prisoners who had personal experience of the reality of the prisons 
from both ages. Based on these memories Solzhenitsyn formulates an interesting conclusion 
about the sociology of prisons. During the Tsar regime, those prisoners who were 
condemned because of obvious political crimes, mainly Esers, Mensheviks, and 
Communiss–in one word: the politicas–, had many privileges making the whole prison life 
more suitable and easier.13 However, this privileged situation completely changed in the 
Soviet era. From the beginning of the twenties, politicals were deprived of all these 
privileges inherited from the earlier age, likewise the Soviet system also encouraged 
ordinary criminals to maltreat and misuse them.
Solzhenitsyn’s final conclusion is simple and sharp: the society of prisons completely 
changed in his age compared to the conditions of the Tsarist regimes. The politicals, who 
were on the top of prison hierarchy, suddenly became the most defenceless group, with 
whom even ordinary criminals, not only the inspectors of the NKVD, could mistreat at any 
time. If one accepts that the internal relationships within a prison inform about the given 
society, since they mirror a radical and polarized picture of the whole society and its 
mechanisms, then this transformation in which politicals basically lost their top position in 
the internal life of Russian prisons can infer many interesting features about the real Soviet 
world. These features may have remained unnoticed without this help.
3. Criminal investigation–the psychology of the interrogator and the victim
Besides the two earlier legal layers, the description of the Soviet criminal investigation 
procedure is also worthy of attention. These chapters are obviously the most shocking parts 
of the Gulag Archipelago. Solzhenitsyn prepared a broad documentation on the basis of 
personal memories of the techniques of the Soviet interrogators.14 Each of them had been 
designed to extract personal confessions, that is, the accused persons had to voluntarily 
acknowledge that they had committed the given crime. Or, at least, these practices had to 
force them to undersign their written confession prepared by the investigative authorities.
The author discusses thirty-one techniques used by the interrogators by dividing them 
into two main categories: psychological and physical methods. However, he also indicates 
the relativity of this grouping since both overlap each other in many areas. Therefore, it is 
simply impossible to precisely distinguish them, as the psychological and physical divisions 
12 Solzhenitsyn: op. cit. 456–485.
13 For example decent food, smoking, gardening, reading, regular walking, the free election of 
spokesmen, free movement among the cells, sending and receiving letters, and finally the option of 
hunger strike. About these “rights” the author writes: “They all returned to prison with a consciousness 
of their rights as convicts and a long-established tradition of how to stand up for them.” Ibid. 460.
14 Solzhenitsyn lists thirty-one different techniques of interrogation from “persuasion in a 
sincere tone” to “bridling” and also indicates that this long list could even be continued. Ibid. 103–
117.
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can only orientate us.15 The list provided by Solzhenitsyn is really appalling but also 
illuminating today. It can precisely show the outcome of a situation which exclusively 
stems from a powerful and strict hierarchy–the relationship of the prisoner and the 
interrogator–and has no precise limits or these limits are only nominally defined and 
everyone, even the prisoner, disregards them.
What is interesting about these inhuman and cruel interrogation methods, is that the 
author does not stop at their “external” and physical description, but he also discusses in 
detail the psychological effects on the victims. The reader can clearly see both the process 
of ‘breaking down the victims’ will and the sophisticated “psychological games” by which 
the interrogator extracts the personal confessions and their signature. On these pages 
Solzhenitsyn presents the human soul being under serious pressure and its refined 
maneuvers:16 what is a human being thinking when he first appear in front of the 
interrogator; how can someone attempt to lie in a logical order; how do the different 
techniques of torture affect the human will; how can someone alleviate his conscience when 
signing the obviously unfounded and false confession that creates serious trouble for others. 
The author familiarizes the reader with the psychological drama that is happening during 
interrogations and tortures.
In these sensitive and many times very personal chapters, the author throws a light on 
the depths of the psychology of criminal investigation by empathically drafting the mental 
processes of an accused person as being in a hopeless situation. His final conclusion shows 
the full understanding of this mental state since he argues that, contrary to all, it is not 
allowed to condemn anyone who confessed or signed their confession since no one can 
precisely know what happened in the dark rooms of the interrogators.
In addition, Solzhenitsyn also illuminates the psychological state of the interrogators by 
analyzing their motives in detail. He points out that even these fearless functionaries cannot 
be regarded as inviolable, since they “tremble” when meeting a prisoner who has absolutely 
nothing to lose. These kinds of prisoners only want to save their “spirit and conscience”, 
therefore they are totally apathetic and indifferent to torture practices that break down 
human will.17 Indifference to violence and torture, be it mental or physical, is the weakest 
point of each officer of the NKVD.
4. Organizational sociology and psychology–the “Organs”
Following a swift overview of the first part of Gulag Archipelago it is obvious that one of 
the most infamous terms is the expression “organs”. Solzhenitsyn practically used this term 
with a universal scope, each department and member of the secret police having very 
different names–only mentioning some of the well-known ones: cheka, GPU, OGPU, 
NKVD, KB–during the Soviet era. He implied that everyone included in this term “organs”, 
had, as their main task, to fight against the internal political enemy. It is, indeed, a metaphor 
about those who had any role in Soviet internal affairs.
Solzhenitsyn’s relationship with this organization was deeply influenced by the fact that 
the Komsomol authorities wanted to send him to an NKVD school during his university 
years, but he refused to enter this school and his friends reacted the same way. He described 
his reasons for this decision when he wrote that he and his friends were intuitively worried 
15 Ibid. 108.
16 For example Ibid. 117–121.
17 Ibid. 130.
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about these men, and they rejected the idea of joining this organ due to irrational motives 
being contrary to their manifest interests. But “it was not our minds that resisted but 
something inside our breasts”, explains Solzhenitsyn, the irrational element is their 
decision.18 This existential experience with its emotional background was obviously further 
deepened by both the personal “meetings” with the “organs” and the stories told by his 
fellows.
In order to understand the functioning and behavior of the “organs”, the author focused 
on a psychological explanation and he also discussed in detail how the “organs” selected 
their functionaries. The service in the secret police, it is argued by Solzhenitsyn, did not at 
all require a high level of education or training. In place of these the only thing the “organs” 
expected from the officers was the ability to carry out precisely the orders coming from 
their leaders. This was intensified by the fact that these, rather unqualified men, mainly the 
majority of investigators, were in an environment where their inhuman instincts, for 
instance, thirst for power or wealth, were reinforced and even encouraged.
At this point the arguments of Solzhenitsyn perfectly meet those of István Bibó, the 
internationally known Hungarian political thinker, who formulated elementary important 
thoughts about the nature of power. Bibó convincingly argues that power is simply a poison, 
especially for those who have already broken their relation with the higher spheres of 
human existence.19 This situation in the “organs”, the meeting of an artificially increased 
thirst for power with rather rudimentary personalities, was completed by a special “official” 
consciousness. The functionaries and officers of the “organs” understood perfectly that it 
was absolutely impossible to imagine a situation in which they were not right, that is, there 
was absolutely no control above them except the realization of orders coming from the 
higher levels. These orders outlined numbers of detentions, judgments or executions that 
had to be met. Only the orders and these “numbers” could be regarded as some kind of 
external pressure and “control” of their activities. 
The author also explains that there was only one law that could not be breached in the 
world of the “organs”: no one could harm others in the organization. This was that very 
simple psychological and sociological “constitution” on which the administration and 
functioning of the secret police was based. However, and it must be stressed, this 
organization determined by such simple principles, ruled the whole Soviet society and the 
everyday life of the citizens. As a state within the state, it basically meant an independent 
world.
Solzhenitsyn’s analysis of the “organs” could also be important nowadays, since it helps 
in the understanding of those external factors that can influence the functioning of 
institutions created by law. In addition, it also explains how these can bias them and turn to 
a totally contradictory direction. Moreover, it also warns what will happen if an organization 
based on force, loses control, so it also attracts attention to the elementary importance of 
law, and, more specially, that of legal guarantees. Chiefly, this argument illustrates the 
theory of the separation of powers as formulated by Montesquieu. If the setting of 
Montesquieu cannot function, only the “organs” remain as a way of the administration of 
power.
18 Ibid. 161.
19 Cf. Bibó, I.: Az európai társadalomfejlődés értelme (The reason of European social 
development). In: Bibó, I.: Válogatott tanulmányok. 3. kötet (Selected Studies. Vol. 3). Budapest, 
1986. 7–18. and 44. 
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5. Legal theory–the relativity of truth
It may be slightly strange at the beginning, but the author implies claims of a legal 
theoretical nature in the first part. From a different aspect it is not too difficult to understand 
this philosophical sensitivity. Solzhenitsyn, being a victim of the secret polic and the Gulag 
industry, would have reflected on the general questions of law with special regard to the 
social role of law and its internal mechanisms.
The most fascinating element of this theoretical reflection is obviously his comment on 
Vyshinsky’s theses about law. The infamous Soviet jurist, Prosecutor General in the darkest 
Soviet years, formulated crucial theses about the nature of truth stemming from his Marxist-
Leninist profession, and the author analyzes these while discussing the formation of the 
Soviet system of administration of justice.20 Vyshinsky argued, when he was analyzing the 
nature of truth, that absolute truth does not exist according to the principles of “flexible 
dialectics”, but the functionaries had to be satisfied with establishing the relative truth. It 
logically follows from the conceptual impossibility of absolute truth that the courts are able 
only to establish the relative truth and, therefore, it is absolutely unnecessary to look for 
absolute evidence, for instance, witnesses or other factual things, during the criminal 
investigation. In a given case, following the earlier theoretical arguments, the investigator 
can establish the relative truth with the help of the personal confession or his political 
consciousness and moral view.
Solzhenitsyn’s brief Vyshinsky analysis is really important, because it perfectly points 
out how political interests are able to bias a theoretical argument in order to achieve their 
goals. As a final point, the author reminds us that political interests, if all the other conditions 
are given, can easily distort any philosophical idea even if they seem to be innocent and 
neutral.
With these earlier theses developed by Vyshinsky the progressive Soviet administration 
of justice returned to the medieval system of divine ordeals and other irrational practices, 
argues Solzhenitsyn. So, the Soviet authorities created a premodern and atavistic system of 
justice which missed all the achievements of modern, formal law. In the eyes of the author 
only one absolute thing remained in this “unique” system based on political interests: the 
bullet they used for execution.21 In conclusion, this theoretical approach unambiguously 
points out that the Soviet system of administration of justice can be regarded as a brand 
new type since it established a totally irrational regime by rejecting the tradition of Western 
Law based on general human rights and procedural guarantees.22
III. Two remarks
Upon discussing these legal layers the essay wants to discuss some questions related to the 
general features of law. Basically, I aim to formulate certain general conclusions with the 
help of Solzhenitsyn’s thoughts.
20 Solzhenitsyn: op. cit. 100–101.
21 Ibid. 101.
22 For a psychological and sociopsychological analysis of the premodern and irrational elements 
of Communist thinking see: Ignatov, A.: Aspects de la psychologie de la „nouvelle classe”. Louvain, 
1980.
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1. Western Law as a contrast
All the earlier presented legal layers could show that Solzhenitsyn had a solid legal 
knowledge since his thoughts and findings are consistently precise and they also reflect a 
sophisticated legal thinking. This considerable legal background is a bit unusual from the 
very first moment, since he mostly studied mathematics at Rostov State University, then he 
fought as a battery commander in World War II, and as such had no special relationship 
with the law or legal sciences. Conversely, his descriptions, analyses, and arguments show a 
high level of legal knowledge that cannot be compared to that of the ordinary Soviet citizen.
The most fascinating and the most surprising at the same time, is his way of using 
contrasting–sometimes directly, in other cases indirectly–the Soviet Law to a qualitatively 
different type of law. That being said, he never discusses certain provisions and mechanisms 
of Soviet criminal law in itself, but in the analysis and assessment he always contrasts those 
with the relevant principles or institutions of Western Law. For instance, in discussing Art. 
58 he also adds that not only its formulation was very problematic, but its “broad 
interpretation” was also a source of trouble. Because of this “broad interpretation” this 
article was an instrument of clear arbitrariness. This statement implies that there are, or 
should be, such legal systems where the rules of criminal law cannot be “as broadly” 
interpreted.
In another part he calls attention to the fact that prior to 1922 the judgments of deporting 
some one to labour camps were based on the “revolutionary legal consciousness” or on 
special decisions since there was no new Socialist criminal code in effect. One can infer 
from this remark that it is absurd in the eyes of the author that someone can be condemned 
without referring to codified legal rules–so the fundamental principle of nullum crimen sine 
lege appears in the background of this remark. Another example the author stresses are the 
so-called “troikas”23 an absolutely unique criminal law institution that united almost every 
phase of the criminal process:, detention, investigation, prosecution, judicature, review, and 
the execution of judgments. This solution, being obviously unconstitutional in a Western 
sense, could only appear since its creators did not adhere to certain “obsolete formalities of 
judicature and obsolete norms”. In the term “obsolete formalities” one can easily discover 
certain critique and irony concerning the refusal of the principle of separation of powers, an 
underlying element of Western legal cultures, and the system of procedural guarantees 
being able to discipline the coercive power implied in law. There are other examples, but, 
the ones mentioned here are enough to illustrate that Solzhenitsyn had a broad and detailed 
legal knowledge.
This special writing method stemming from the harsh contrast of these two conceptions 
of law–the Western and the Soviet–can have a twofold interpretation. On the one hand, it 
can be approached from the aspect of literature. This approach is highly efficient, as the 
direct or the foreshadowed contrast helps the reader to better understand the absurdity of 
the whole phenomenon, that is, the functioning of Soviet criminal justice in political cases, 
than the simple description or data collection. However, on the other hand, there is another 
explication from a legal point. It may also be inferred that the author had a proper view 
about what was the normal Western solution in a given case, and he felt that they were 
convicted because of the lack of rule-of-law and other traditional limits of arbitrariness. So, 
23 Their official name was OSO (Special Board), a board consisting of three men and mostly 
concerned with counterrevolutionary cases. They were subordinated to the Minister of Internal 
Affairs, therefore no appeal jurisdiction existed. Solzhenitsyn: op. cit. 285.
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these contrasts express a certain state of mind in which they felt a strong deficiency in 
Western solutions and mechanisms. Solzhenitsyn and his fellows perhaps knew, or at least 
felt, that their cases could have had substantially different outcomes in other legal cultures–
and that could be a infuriating feeling for them.24
In conclusion, Solzhenitsyn in these contrasts, by juxtaposing the abnormality of Soviet 
law to the normality implied in the concept of Western law, is capable of effectively 
showing it to Western readers, too. And, indeed, that might be one of the main reasons why 
Western readers really understand these chapters.
How could a mathematician and engineer know so much about the principles of rule-of-
law and constitutionalism?–can the readers adequately formulate this question? For the 
answer this paper has only a hypothesis, and it could even be incorrect. However, only on 
the level of experiment, it is worthwhile discussing it.
In the first part a secondary figure appears, an Estonian lawyer, Arnold Susi. Solzhenitsyn 
characterizes him as follows:
“Thanks to his horn-rimmed glasses and straight lines above the eyes, his face became 
severe, perspicacious, exactly the face of an educated man of our century as we might 
picture it to ourselves. Back before the Revolution he had studied at the Faculty of 
History and Philology of the University of Petrograd […]. Later, in Tartu, he had 
studied law. In addition to Estonian, he spoke English and German, and through all 
these years he continued to read the London Economist and the German scientific 
‘Berichte’ summaries. He had studied the constitutions and codes of law of various 
countries–and in our cell he represented Europe worthily and with restraint. He had 
been a leading lawyer in Estonia and been known as ‘kuldsuu’–meaning ‘golden-
tongued’.”25
It can be easily imagined, however it cannot be exactly proved, that Solzhenitsyn learnt 
both the basics of criminal law and jurisprudence as well as the main features of Western 
legal culture from Susi during their discussions in the prison yard.26 The following quote 
may strengthen this idea:
“And he would tell me passionately about his own interests, and these were Estonia 
and democracy. (…) I nevertheless kept listening and listening to his loving stories of 
the twenty free years (…). I listened to the principles of the Estonian constitution, 
which had been borrowed from the best European experience, and how their hundred-
member, one house Parliament worked. And, though, why of it wasn’t clear, I began to 
like it all and store it all away in my experience.” (emphasis made by the author).27
24 When Solzhenitsyn discusses that interrogators used the personal confessions of the accused 
persons as the chief proof of guilt he refers to the Fifth Amendment of the US Constitution ordering: 
“Nor shall (any person” be compelled in a criminal case to be a witness against himself.” Then he 
repeats “not to be compelled” in italics in order to emphasize the absurdity of the entire thing. 
(Moreover, he also mentions the Bill of Rights) Ibid. 101. Footnote 9.
25 Ibid. 205.
26 In his monograph Scammel mentions Arnold Susi and acknowledges his personal influence 
on him. Scammel argues that this was Solzhenitsyn’s first “meeting” with an educated European that 
is with the European culture. Scammel: op. cit. 157.
27 Ibid. 213.
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This legal knowledge, which he gradually learnt during these regular conversations, 
became for him much more unambiguous that their convictions and judgments were 
contrary to general legal principles and standards. So, he could also realize the scandalous 
nature of the whole process in Western terms not only in an intuitive way. In conclusion, 
Solzhenitsyn’s contrasting method stems from his unusual knowledge of Western legal 
culture and its efficiency is related to his writing skills and personal Gulag experiences.
2. Solzhenitsyn’s language–access to the personal-psychological dimensions of law?
The earlier analysis leads to the last piece of this essay. One should conceive that the author 
does not only simply describe the mechanisms and stories of the Gulag, but he also 
demonstrates these with such metaphors which go far beyond the framework of rational 
cognition.28
The author’s metaphorical pictures–for instance:
“[the] great, powerful, abundant, highly ramified, multiform, wide-sweeping 58, which 
summed up the whole world […] In all truth, there is no step, thought, action, or lack 
of action, under the heavens which could not be punished by the heavy hand of Art. 
58.”29
or
“[you can be] one of the little links of in the Organs–that flexible, unitary organism 
inhabiting a nation as a tapeworm inhabits a human body.”30
and
“It ought to have examined that glimmering light which, in time, the soul of the lonely 
prison begins to emit, like the halo of a saint. Torn from the hustle-bustle of everyday 
life in so absolute a degree that even counting the passing minutes puts him intimately 
in touch with the Universe, the lonely prisoner has to have been purged of every 
imperfection […].31
–affect emotions and other, mostly unconscious, dimensions of the human mind. These are 
able to exert influence upon human thinking beyond the frame of reason. That being said, 
by using these pictures, the author highlights the fundamentally non-logical and non-
rational dimensions of law being generally out of the scope of professional legal discourse. 
And, indeed, it must remind lawyers that law is not only a set of simple paragraphs framed 
in a comprehensive logical structure, but it also psychologically affects human beings. That 
is, the law can generate serious psychological reactions determining the entire future life of 
those who had some kind of access to the judiciary. In conclusion, it should be admitted 
that the law has a personal-psychological dimension besides its existence as a rule with a 
28 In the contemporary literature of sociology Rudolf Rezsohazy argues that rational cognition 
cannot be regarded as an exclusive way of cognition. Besides science love, faith, art, and moral also 
offers many options for cognition, and these spheres have their own internal logic, too. Rezsohazy, R.: 
Sociologie des valeurs. Paris, 2006. 131–134.
29 Solzhenitsyn: op. cit. 60.
30 Ibid. 149.
31 Ibid. 483.
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general scope and that these two dimensions are strongly interlinked and cannot be 
dissociated.
From this aspect, one prominent value of the book is easily identifiable. The literary 
genius of Solzhenitsyn can produce such a picture of Soviet law and the administration of 
justice which does not lack this personal-psychological aspect, although the precise rules 
are also broadly discussed and analyzed. Therefore, his work presents those aspects of the 
reality of Soviet law that would simply be an impossible task by definition for professional 
legal literature.32 Subsequently, the merits of Solzhenitsyn cannot be denied in the 
description of the reality of law, since he puts together data and professional descriptions 
with this personal-psychological dimension of law. He also provided a much more complete 
picture of Soviet law than professional legal monographs and papers could have ever done.
IV. One lesson
As a closing remark, a general lesson can also be formulated concerning the Gulag 
Archipelago. This work of Solzhenitsyn should caution lawyers of the consequences of 
such a politically-oriented approach to law that denies the traditional material and procedural 
guarantees which emerged in Western law. If the sole standard for law is the accomplishment 
of political goals and the realization of narrow group interests, only one thing can happen: 
everything that happened to the people deported to the various “islands” of Gulag.
This warning may further shade our picture about our own legal systems. Nowadays, 
there is a widespread dissatisfaction with the functioning of traditional legal institutions, 
and–one should also admit it–it has good reasons in the majority of the cases. However, 
having been familiarized with the legal layers of the Gulag Archipelago it seems obvious 
that the Western legal culture33 has manifest advantages compared to the alternatives that 
existed in 20th century. If one contrasts these two approaches to law, that of the Soviet and 
Western, the predictability and rationality of the Western one will gain predominance. 
Although, naturally, it cannot be regarded as a perfect one, it can even guarantee such a 
high level of security for the citizens that it would be impossible in legal systems solely 
based on the orders and the discretion of the political will.
It highlights that our critiques about the imperfect functioning of our legal systems 
should endeavor to improve them. Those critical movements that tried swiftly to break 
down these traditional structures and also aimed to build up a totally new regime were 
misguided attempts, as the examples of Soviet and Nazi legal regimes show. These 
approaches turned law away from the generally accepted European values, that is, they 
made it a slave to political will and intentions.
32 A similar thesis is also argued by the French historian Stéphan Curtois. He asserts that 
Solzhenitsyn could describe the reality of Gulag by his literary genius and not by the precise 
intellectual, logical, and data-based argumentation. And, this literary description shocked mostly the 
Western public opinion in fact, the discussion of crimes had only a secondary place in the Western 
understanding of Gulag. Curtois: op. cit. 27.
33 René David, the famous French comparatist argues that the core of Western law is the idea of 
rule-of-law. See, David, R.: Existe-t-il un droit occidental? In: Nadelmann, K. H.–von Meheren, A. 
T.–Hazard, J. (eds): XXth Century Comparative and Conflicts Law. Legal Essays in Honor of Hessel 
E. Yntema. Leyden 1961. 56–64.
